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The fundamental assumptions in the law and economics literature about 
shareholder voting and the one-share/one-vote rule are flawed.  The classic view is that 
share ownership is necessary and sufficient to create voting rights and that such rights 
should be directly proportional to share ownership.  We demonstrate that this assumption 
is unfounded, both for shares that are “economically encumbered” (held by shareholders 
who are not pure residual claimants; e.g., a shareholder who owns one share and is also 
short one or more shares) as well as shares that are “legally encumbered” (held or 
associated with more than one shareholder; e.g., shares that are loaned to a short, who 
sells that share to another buyer).   
The one-share/one-vote rule is not only economically suboptimal, but results in 
substantial deleterious consequences.  Quorum and regulatory requirements are distorted; 
mergers and acquisitions are too easily approved; securities class actions are undervalued 
and simultaneously under- and over-compensate; bankruptcy distributions are over- and 
under- inclusive; and fixed-ratio stock offers are preferred over economically superior 
alternatives.  These results all derive from an unfounded reliance upon the one-share/one-
vote principle and the belief that even economically or legally encumbered shares are 
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Encumbered Shares* 




 Corporate law treats shares equally.  For example, in a merger, each share is 
entitled to one vote.  Similarly, in a class action lawsuit or bankruptcy proceeding, each 
share is entitled to a pro rata recovery.  The law and economics literature has uniformly 
supported these results. 
We show that treating shares equally leads to perverse results.  Mergers are 
approved even if they destroy value.  Shareholders who should be entitled to recover in 
class actions or bankruptcy proceedings recover less than their entitlement, whereas 
shareholders with no entitlement nonetheless recover.  Shareholders who should be 
barred from voting are allowed to vote, while non-shareholders who arguably should be 
allowed to vote cannot.  
We demonstrate that the assumptions about shareholder rights in the law and 
economics literature are flawed.  In the leading article in this field, Frank H. Easterbrook 
and Daniel R. Fischel maintain that corporate law properly allocates votes to common 
shareholders as the residual claimants to a corporation’s income.1  This argument 
contends that common law rules of shareholder voting – specifically, default rules that 
give one vote to each common share and no (or few) votes to other claimants, broadly 
known as the rule of “one-share/one-vote” – properly allocate voting rights in ways that 
minimize agency costs and mimic the rules for which shareholders and other corporate 
constituents would contract absent transaction costs.2  Shareholders are granted voting 
rights, it is contended, and have such rights in direct proportion to the number of shares 
each holds because they have “similar if not identical” preferences as to their desires for 
the firm, and are collectively the group with appropriate incentives to make discretionary 
decisions because they receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of the marginal 
costs of those decisions.3 
This agency cost rationale for corporate voting rules was a response to scholarly 
argument based on the findings of Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means in the 1930s 
                                                 
* The authors are Professors of Law at the University of San Diego School of Law.  We 
have benefited from helpful suggestions by Jill Fisch, Mathew McCubbins, David McGowan, 
Troy Paredes, Daniel Rodriguez, Steven Schwarcz, Alan Schwartz, and Lynn Stout, and 
participants at a workshop at the Washington University School of Law. 
1 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & Econ. 
395, 403-406 (1983); see also Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of 
Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911, 1945-46 (1996) (“The case for the one share, one vote 
rule turns primarily on its ability to match economic incentives with voting power and to preserve 
the market for corporate control as a check on bad management.”). 
2 Conversely, the argument goes, federal rules or proposals that would change these 
minimum-cost default rules are inefficient.  Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, at 
418-27. 
3 Id. at 405; see also Merton Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and 
the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411 (1961) (advancing a similar argument); Myron Scholes, 
The Market for Securities: Substitution versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on 
Share Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179 (1972) (same). 
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that managers used the voting machinery of public corporations to wrest control from 
shareholders and expropriate gains for themselves.4  Since then, hundreds of corporate 
legal scholars have debated whether competition among states has led to efficient default 
rules, with many scholars arguing that common law default rules, primarily adopted by 
competing states (but also by stock exchanges), are efficient,5 whereas others maintain 
that Berle and Means were correct and that such competition has generated inefficient 
and inequitable rules in a race to the bottom.6 
Specific arguments about corporate voting have surfaced periodically during this 
broader debate about ownership and control.  This occurred most notably in the particular 
contexts generated by hostile takeovers,7 shareholder activism,8 and corporate scandals.9 
Notwithstanding these limited forays into the arena of shareholder voting, scholars have 
not seriously challenged the theoretical underpinnings of the dominant view of corporate 
voting.  Instead, Easterbrook and Fischel’s work on corporate voting (and its progeny) 
have become largely canonical, and its assumptions not subject to vigorous inspection. 10  
                                                 
4 See Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (1932). 
5 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (1993); Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 73 (1991); Ralph K. 
Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 
251 (1977). 
6 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits 
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435 (1992); William Cary, 
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974). 
7 See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, One Share-One Vote and the Market 
for Corporate Control, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 175 (1988) (analyzing the optimality of the one-share/one-
vote rule for allocating control); Louis Lowenstein, Shareholder Voting Rights: A Response to 
SEC Rule 19c-4 and to Professor Gilson, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 979 (1988); Ronald J. Gilson, 
Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 807 (1987). 
8 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a 
Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 Yale J. Reg. 174 (2001); Thomas A. Smith, 
Institutions and Entrepreneurs in American Corporate Finance, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1997); Lynne 
L. Dallas, The Control and Conflict of Interest Voting Systems, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 1 (1992); John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity vs. Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1277 (1991). 
9 See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 Tul. 
L. Rev. 1275 (2002); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for Management and Control of the 
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Responses, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1233 (2002). 
10 See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1103, 1121 (2002) (“As Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have shown, in a system with voting rights that are not 
proportional to the voter’s stake in the enterprise, there will be a reduced incentive for voters to 
make optimal decisions, because the gains or losses stemming from these decisions will not be 
internalized at a level corresponding to the influence of one’s vote.  Therefore any rule other than 
one-share/one-vote wastefully increases the agency costs associated with the corporate form.”); 
cf. Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R. Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting, 79 Iowa 
L. Rev. 485 (1994) (questioning the development of the law and economics theory of corporate 
voting, but noting that the “theory holds together as far as it goes”). 
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Recent analyses of corporate voting have similarly focused on the voting mechanism but 
have ignored the normative basis for the underlying investiture of voting rights.11 
Meanwhile, changes in the markets and in finance theory make it plain that the 
assumptions central to the paradigmatic position on corporate voting no longer hold, if 
they ever did.  It simply is not true that the “preferences of shareholders are likely to be 
similar if not identical”12  Shareholders are not necessarily, or even commonly, in the 
residual claimant position that the literature has heretofore assumed.  Parties ins tead 
routinely utilize financial derivatives and structured finance techniques to reallocate 
various interests in the firm, including both residual claims and voting rights.   
For example, Easterbrook and Fischel assume that “[i]t is not possible to separate 
the voting right from the equity interest.”13  But equity derivatives make it a 
straightforward exercise to do precisely that, and to separate a vote from the economic 
returns of stock.14  Moreover, financial contracting increasingly results in shareholders 
holding not “pure” residual claims, but portfolio positions that include options, forward 
contracts, and other financial derivatives.  These differing positions of such shareholders 
pose a serious challenge to the conclusions of the dominant literature.15   
Consider the simplest case:  a shareholder who owns one share and also holds a 
one-share short position. 16  That shareholder has a residual claim to the corporation’s 
income through the share, but the incentives associated with that claim are directly offset 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Voting Models, Corporate Elections 
and Takeover Bids, July 30, 2003 (working paper, available at SSRN); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan 
Schwartz, Sales and Elections as Methods of Transferring Corporate Control, 2 Theoretical Inq. 
L. 783 (2001); Lucian Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for 
Corporate Control, Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 336 (October 2001) 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 8633 (2001)). 
12 Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, at 405. 
13 Id. at 410 
14 For example, parties can purchase stock and simultaneously sell equity derivatives 
representing a short position in that stock.  See Frank Partnoy, Some Policy Implications of 
Single-Stock Futures, Futures & Derivatives Law Report, Mar. 2001, at 8; see also infra 
(discussing additional encumbrances that can effectively separate the vote from the underlying 
equity interest). 
15 When shareholders’ interests are not homogenous, it is not possible to aggregate 
shareholder preferences into a consistent system of choices.  See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. 
Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. Legal Stud. 
1105 (2000); Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Collective Values (2d ed. 1963).  Scholars 
have challenged the homogeneity assumptions of law and economics scholarship in other areas of 
corporate law.  See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, 
Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 Va. L. Rev. 611 (1995); Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient 
Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance (2000).  Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of 
portfolio positions, however, no one has applied these same finance principles and practices to 
corporate voting; instead, the optimality of the dominant Easterbrook and Fischel principle of 
one-share/one-vote has been assumed. 
16 To establish a short position, a person typically borrows a share and sells it.  See Short 
Sales, SEC Concept Release No. 34-42037, File No. S7-24-99, n.1 (1999).  Synthetic short 
positions also can be established by selling single -stock futures or by selling an at-the-money call 
option (with an exercise price equal to the price of the stock), buying an at-the-money put option, 
and borrowing the present value of the exercise price. 
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by those of the short position.  Whatever benefit results from an increase (or decrease) in 
the value of the stock results in an equivalent decrease (or increase) in the value of the 
short position.  Such a short-holding shareholder retains a residua l claim to the 
corporation’s income, but does not have the same economic incentives as a “pure” 
shareholder; nonetheless, she remains entitled to a vote.  Even a shareholder who owns a 
single share and simultaneously holds a ten-share short position retains a vote, even 
though her net economic interest is directly counter to that of other shareholders.   
We discuss more complex cases of such differential incentives in Part III.A., 
including shareholders with put and/or call positions or other derivative claims.  Such 
examples are the norm in modern financial markets, as shareholders – particularly large 
institutions and hedge funds – typically hold portfolios that can include both short and 
derivative positions. 
Conversely, non-shareholders frequently acquire through financial engineering 
synthetic residual positions with incentives equivalent to a “pure” residual claim.17  Such 
non-shareholders face the exact same incentives as shareholders in the world imagined by 
Easterbrook and Fischel; however, notwithstanding those homogeneous incentives, such 
non-shareholders do not have a vote.  Non-shareholders who replicate share positions 
using financial derivatives acquire portfolio positions that mimic those of pure residual 
shareholders.  Yet neither market pressures nor regulatory initiatives have led to the 
shifting of voting rights from shareholders who do not have the proper incentives to non-
shareholders who do. 
Modern practices of borrowing shares and voting in “street name”18 further 
complicate the analysis of voting.  Consider the typical owner of a share eligible to be 
loaned, often because she holds these shares in a margin account.  She typically does not 
know whether her shares actually have been loaned out (e.g., to a client of the broker who 
wishes to sell the shares short).  Moreover, she assumes that because she owns a share – 
and hence will incur gains or losses from movement in the share price – she is entitled to 
vote that share.  If, however, one of her shares has in fact been loaned, she technically 
should not be entitled to vote it, because only one vote is allowed per share, and her share 
has been loaned to a short seller, who has sold that loaned share (alongside the right to 
vote it) to someone else.  A single share should result in a single vote, not two; as a result, 
by loaning the share to the short, the original shareholder should have divested herself of 
the vote, which would then belong to the person who bought the share from the short. 
However, if shareholders believed that they lost voting rights when their shares 
were loaned, they might be reluctant to lend shares, to the detriment of both brokers, who 
receive (sometimes substantial) compensation from share lending, as well as to market 
liquidity.  The bizarre solution to this problem is that brokers allow both shareholders to 
vote, and simply reallocate the votes from shareholders who have not submitted proxies 
                                                 
17 A non-shareholder could replicate a share position by purchasing a single -stock future; 
by purchasing an at-the-money call option, selling an at-the-money put option, and lending the 
present value of the exercise price of the options; or by entering into other similar equity 
derivatives.  See infra (Part III.B).  Such positions might be called “synthetic” shares. 
18 Shares held in “street name” are held in the name of a broker or other nominee instead 
of the customer, primarily to facilitate share transfer.   
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to shareholders who have voted but whose shares have been loaned out.19  As a result, 
both the original owner and the shareholder who purchased this same loaned share are 
each allowed to vote; in essence, a single share can generate multiple votes.20 
Shareholders are unaware of this vote switching, which works only if few 
shareholders actually vote.  Only voter apathy and manipulation of the voting process 
prevent pervasive overvoting.  This is not merely a theoretical problem:  in some cases, 
the total number of votes cast may exceed the actual number of shares.21 
We characterize as “economically encumbered” those shares that are held by 
stockholders who may lack the otherwise homogeneous incentives generated by “pure” 
share ownership (e.g., who hold both a share and a short or other derivative position).  
We characterize as “legally encumbered” those shares that are held by stockholders who 
may have a legal impediment to voting such shares (e.g., who have loaned out such 
shares to a broker or short-seller, or who maintain a synthetic position that mimics a share 
but does not create the right to vote). 
We discuss herein whether the dominant one-share/one-vote principle is in fact 
the optimal default value in existing financial markets.  First, we examine the rationale 
for one-share/one-vote in a more complex and realistic institutional environment than 
other scholars have assumed.  Second, we consider whether current policy of corporate 
voting could be improved given contemporary financial structures; specifically, we 
propose and assess a rule that certain types of encumbered shares should not be entitled 
to a vote.22  Finally, we evaluate the potentially deleterious effects of the existing one-
share/one-vote regime on quorum and regulatory requirements, approval of corporate 
mergers and acquisitions, resolution of securities class actions, bankruptcy distributions, 
and selection of fixed-ratio stock offers as opposed to alternatives.  
We address these issues in four additional parts.  Part II assesses the development 
of corporate voting practices and regulation.  Our account of this practice differs from 
that described in the law and economics literature:  the evolution of the one-share/one-
vote rule is not as straightforward as has been assumed, and practices and regulation 
                                                 
19 In other words, the initial long position technically loses its vote when the share is 
loaned out in a short sale, but the broker nevertheless permits that long position to vote, so long as 
there are other long positions not voting.  The broker simply allows one long position to vote 
another’s unvoted shares.  Share lending thereby effectively creates new votes, as each share is 
passed around to numerous investors, each of whom assumes that she is entitled to vote the 
shares. 
20  Indeed, a single share could generate more than two votes if that share is loaned more 
than once – a not uncommon event (e.g., a share is loaned by the original stockholder to a short, 
who then sells the share to a new buyer, who may in turn loan the share to another short, and so 
on).  
21 See, e.g., Ganesh, LLC v. Computer Learning Centers, Inc., 183 F.R.D. 487, 491 (E.D. 
Va. 1998) (noting that the six million shares of CLC sold short exceeded the company’s actual 
float). 
22 We propose, for example, that certain types of economically encumbered shares should 
retain a vote only to the extent their holder retains a “pure” residual interest.  For linear (i.e., long 
and short) positions, the calculation of such a net residual interest would be simple (e.g., one 
share plus one short would receive zero votes, two shares plus one short would receive one vote, 
and so on).  For non-linear (i.e., options) positions, the effect on voting would more complex, and 
we consider the merits of a voting regime based on the modern theory of options pricing. 
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continue to evolve, particularly in response to differential shareholder preferences and 
financial innovation.  Part III then analyzes the various manners in which shares can be 
encumbered, and sets forth the initial argument that encumbered shares should not be 
entitled to vote.  Part IV further considers whether non-shareholders with synthetic 
residual claims should be entitled to vote.  Part V finally analyzes the policy effects of the 
proposed encumbered share rule in several areas, and identifies the deficiencies of the 
existing regime. 
 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE VOTING PRACTICES AND 
REGULATION 
 
 The practice of corporate voting has evolved in fits and starts, beginning with 
voting practices that treated shareholders as individual voters, then moving toward one-
share/one-vote, and in recent decades moving to a rich mix of practices, including 
multiple-class common and preferred shares, as well as shares with multiple de facto 
votes as a result of share lending.  The changes have been driven both by market forces 
and regulatory initiatives.  This is not (or at least not entirely) a story about the efficient 
evolution of common law rules. 
Corporate voting practices initially arose from analogous rules applicable to 
governmental decision making. 23  Corporations or similar legal entities were initially 
formed to undertake governmental functions, and accordingly carried the same voting 
practices as those familiar from the political process.  Larger shareholdings typically 
were entitled to a greater share of control, just as the wealthy members of society had a 
greater governance role.  For example, the Roman government created publicani, legal 
bodies resembling the modern corporation, with ownership divided into partes, or shares, 
of two types: large shares (socii) held by the wealthiest members of society, and small 
shares (particulae), held more widely by the public.24  One-share/one-vote was not the 
dominant rule. 
The middle ages were not conducive to share ownership, but the early joint-stock 
companies of the fourteenth century were similar to the Roman publicani.25  At common 
law, each shareholder had one vote regardless of the number of shares she owned.26  In 
Europe, one-shareholder/one-vote became a common practice, and was widely perceived 
to be fairer and more democratic than one-share/one-vote. 27  The general conception of a 
                                                 
23 See David L. Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections 
on the Rule of "One Share, One Vote", 56 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 44-53 (1970); cf. Zohar Goshen, 
Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability Rule , 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 741, 789-93 
(1997) (concluding that more recent judicial treatment of corporate voting favors dictatorship, not 
democracy). 
24 See Edward Chancellor, Devil Take the Hindmost 4-5 (1999). 
25 See Fernand Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce 101 (1982); see generally Meir Cohn, 
The Origins of Western Economic Success: Commerce, Finance, and Government in Pre-
Industrial Europe (draft 2003), available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~mkohn/. 
26 See David Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on 
the Rule of “One Share, One Vote”, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1970). 
27 See Colleen A. Dunlavy, Corporate Governance in the Late 19th Century Europe and 
USA - The Case of Shareholder Voting Rights, in Comparative Corporate Governance 5 (Klaus J. 
Hopt et al. eds., 1998). 
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shareholder meeting was of a meeting among citizens of a small village, who would vote 
on the group’s business by show of hands.28 
During the sixteenth century, joint-stock companies were formed in England with 
divided shares, with ownership concentrated among a few wealthy individuals.  Members 
of the public bought various securities, but a series of speculative bubbles and crashes 
through the nineteenth century (e.g., East India Company, South Sea Bubble, Latin 
American mining) discouraged broad participation in corporations and corporate 
governance. 
By the nineteenth century, companies in Europe had moved some distance from 
one-shareholder/one-vote toward one-share/one-vote.29  Various non- linear voting 
schemes developed during this period, with, for example, small shareholdings receiving 
one vote per share, and votes per share declining above some specified level. 30  The 
concept of one-share/one-vote nonetheless remained controversial, and even during the 
nineteenth century, default rules of one-share/one-vote nevertheless capped voting per 
shareholder (e.g., at ten shares per person). 
Consider the following two examples from this period:31 
 
England 
Shareholdings    Votes 
First 10 shares    1 vote per share 
Every add’l 5 shares to 100  1 vote per 5 shares 
Every add’l 10 shares   1 vote per 10 shares 
 
France 
Shareholdings    Votes  
0-4 shares    None 
5-10 shares    1 vote 
11-20 shares    2 votes 
21-40 shares    3 votes 
40 shares or more   5 votes 
 
 In the English example, voting is limited as shareholdings increase.  In the French 
example, small shareholdings receive no vote at all, but large shareholdings are limited as 
well.  In neither case is one share generally entitled to one vote.  Germany imposed 
similar voting ceilings for companies listed on the stock exchange,32 and German 
corporate law prohibited shareholders with more than five or ten percent of a company’s 
                                                 
28 See Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, The 
Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 791, 819 
(2002) (citing a finding that “unless the company’s regulations otherwise provide, voting is in the 
first instance by show of hands, i.e., those present indicate their views by raising their hands.”). 
29 See generally Stuart Banner, The Pernicious Art of Securities Regulation: Cultural and 
Political Roots, 1690-1860 (1998).   
30 See David Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on 
the Rule of “One Share, One Vote”, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1970). 
31 See Pistor et al., at 819.  
32 See Pistor et al., at 820 n.126. 
10
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equity from voting any additional votes over that percentage.33  These hybrid approaches 
were a compromise between the politically democratic principle of one-shareholder/one-
vote and the economically democratic principle of one-share/one-vote.   
One-share/one-vote did not become the predominant legal rule in Europe until it 
had already become firmly established in the United States.  Consistent with historical 
practice in Europe, the early U.S. approach was to limit by statute the voting power of 
any single stockholder.34  The first Delaware Corporate Law, for example, permitted 
corporations to determine in their by- laws “what number of shares shall entitle the 
stockholders to one or more votes.”35  In 1897, the Delaware Constitution was amended 
to impose the requirement of one-share/one-vote in “all elections where directors are 
managers of stock corporations.”36  But the Delaware legislature quickly removed this 
mandatory rule, replacing it with what has become Section 212(a) of the General 
Corporation Law, which provides for a one-share/one-vote default rule “unless otherwise 
provided in the certificate of incorporation.”37   
Delaware law accordingly presently establishes a default rule of one-share/one-
vote, but continues to allow voting schemes similar to the English and French examples 
above.38  Other American jurisdictions have taken similar approaches, although some 
formally require one-share/one-vote regardless of contrary corporate preference.39 
                                                 
33 See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance 
and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l 
L. 213, 237 n. 71 (1999). 
34 See Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121, 125 (Del. 1977) (describing 
early practice). 
35 17 Del. L. Ch. 147, § 18 (1883). 
36 Delaware Constitution, Article 9, § 6 (1897). 
37 Del. Code § 212(a). 
38 See Providence & Worcester, 378 A.2d at121 n.2 (upholding an 1844 voting provision 
providing that “each shareholder shall be entitled to one vote for every share of the common stock 
of said company owned by him no exceeding fifty shares, and one vote for every twenty shares 
more than fifty, owned by him; provided, that no stockholder shall be entitled to vote upon more 
than one fourth part of the whole  number of shares issued and outstanding of the common stock 
of said company, unless as proxy for other members.”).  Early bank charters had similar capped 
provisions.  See Oesterle & Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting, 79 Iowa L. 
Rev. 485, 511 n.52 (1994). 
39 These states would require that even encumbered shares be entitled to vote, even if 
corporations wanted to divest such shares of this right.  For example, New York provides that 
“every stockholder of record must be entitled at every stockholders’ meeting to one vote for every 
share standing in his name on the record of stockholders.”  9 N.Y. Jur. 2d Banks and Financial 
Institutions § 83; see also 8 Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corp. § 4209 (noting that corporate 
bylaws are ineffective to deprive a shareholder “of either the right to vote given by charter or 
statute, or the number of votes to which the shareholder is entitled, or impose new qualifications 
on the shareholder as a voter or unreasonable restrictions on the exercise of the shareholder’s 
rights”).  Some states have enshrined this principle in their Constitution, unalterable by even 
deliberate and unanimous corporate election.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Dewey Portland Cement Co. 
v. O’Brien, 142 W.Va. 451, 463-64 (1956) (hold ing that corporation’s issuance of non-voting 
stock was barred by Article XI, Section 4, of the Constitution of West Virginia, which requires 
“that in all elections for directors or managers of incorporated companies, every stockholder shall 
have the right to vote, in person or by proxy, for the number of shares of stock owned by him, for 
11
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The impetus for a one-share/one-vote requirement in U.S. markets was not 
competition for state corporate charters; most states permitted, and still permit, the 
creation of classes of shares with limited voting rights.  Nor did the pressure come 
initially from market participants; during the early twentieth century, companies had little 
difficulty selling shares with no voting rights at all.  Shareholders apparently understood 
that their power came from the threat to exit by selling shares, not from the (rarely 
exercised) right to vote.40   
Instead, the requirement of one-share/one-vote stemmed from a populist uprising 
and the New York Stock Exchange’s worries about possible federal regulation (and 
related damage to its reputation).  During the 1920s, corporations increasingly restricted 
the voting rights of certain classes of shareholders, moving away from one-share/one-
vote.  In 1925, when a few leading corporations, including Dodge Brothers, Inc., and 
Industrial Rayon Corporation, sold major issues of nonvoting common stock, there was 
widespread public criticism.41  In response, the NYSE began disapproving of the listing 
of nonvoting common stock issues.  As Joel Seligman has concluded, “[i]n retrospect, the 
primary motivation for the NYSE’s initial decision on nonvoting common stock was 
concern about public opinion.”42   
During the next several decades, the NYSE generally continued its practice of 
refusing to list companies with nonvoting shares, with a few prominent exceptions when 
it was politically or economically inconvenient.43  This relatively stable period apparently 
is the one from which Easterbrook and Fischel derive their conclusion that one-share/one-
vote has been the dominant rule and practice.   
In the 1980s, competition in the market for corporate control increased markedly, 
and voting practices became more important.44  The threat of hostile takeovers led 
                                                                                                                                                 
as many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected”); see also 7 Ill. Prac., Business 
Organizations § 9.15 (noting that the 1870 Constitution of Illinois provided that “[t]he General 
Assembly shall provide, by law, that in all elections for directors or managers of incorporated 
companies, every stockholder shall have the right to vote, in person or by proxy, for the number 
of shares of stock owned by him, for as many persons as there are directors or managers to be 
elected, or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the number of 
directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock shall equal, or to distribute them on the 
same principle among as many candidates as he shall think fit; and such directors or managers 
shall not be elected in any other manner”). 
40 See Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 
1427 (1964). 
41 See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common 
Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 Geo. W. L. Rev. 687, 695 (1986). 
42 Id. 
43 For example, in 1956, the NYSE agreed to list a class of shares of Ford Motor 
Company, even though the Ford family controlled 40 percent of the company’s voting power.  
See Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law and 
Federal Regulation, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 961, 977 (2003).  The NYSE also has listed shares of 
The New York Times, even though public shares had only one vote, while the insider (family) 
stock had ten. 
44 Easterbrook and Fischel argue that the private value of control was limited by the fact 
that all shareholders held a claim to any upside generated by a control change; finance scholars 
modeled the incentive function of the capital structure by assuming control has a private value.  
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managers to favor moving away from the principle of one-share/one-vote to other voting 
regimes, most notably dual-class recapitalizations.45  Managers perceived that one-
share/one-vote was costly to them, and began to lobby for changes to NYSE practice.  At 
the same time, the NYSE, having enjoyed a dominant market position for decades, found 
its listings challenged by the NASDAQ and AMEX, neither of which required one-
share/one-vote.  In response to these political and economic pressures, the NYSE 
abandoned its early policy, and began permitting voting regimes other than one-
share/one-vote, formally liberalizing its approach in 1986 (three years after Easterbrook 
and Fischel’s article on corporate voting was published).46   
Scholars generally were critical of the NYSE’s policy shift.47  In response, and 
with the support of several legal academics,48 in 1988 the SEC promulgated Rule 19c-4, 
which required the exchanges to bar the listing of a corporation that acted to reduce the 
voting rights of any class of shareholders.  However, two years later, the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that this rule was beyond the SEC’s authority. 49  
Ultimately, the SEC pressured the exchanges to adopt some limitations on the issuance of 
nonvoting shares or multiple-class shares with different voting rights.  Exchange rules 
                                                                                                                                                 
See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, One Share-One Vote and the Market for 
Corporate Control, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 175 (1988); Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Corporate 
Governance: Voting Rights and Majority Rules, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 203 (1988). 
45 In a dual-class recapitalization, a corporation issues a new class of common shares with 
voting rights superior to those of the original shares.  The original shares typically receive 
compensation in the form of a higher dividend.  One theory supporting management’s decision to 
issue a new class of shares with superior voting rights is that if the new shares are friendly to 
management, they will vote to oppose a hostile takeover. 
46 The impact of competition from NASDAQ and AMEX upon the NYSE was evident 
even before Easterbrook and Fischel published their seminal piece.  For example, in 1982, 
General Motors acquired EDS and issued restricted voting shares, daring the NYSE to delist its 
shares.  In response, the NYSE diluted its rule, encouraging other companies to establish dual-
class share structures. 
47 See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, One Share-One Vote and the Market 
for Corporate Control, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 175 (1988) (one-share/one-vote is the optimal rule for 
allocating control); Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Corporate Governance: Voting Rights and 
Majority Rules, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 203 (1988) (same conclusion for both simple majority voting 
rules and one-share/one-vote).  Scholars also noted the irony of managers’ virulent opposition to 
weighted voting schemes while simultaneously embracing “super voting” stock – which they 
awarded to friendly interests – to fend off hostile takeovers.  See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate 
Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate Social Responsibility, 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 205, 209 
n.19 (2001).  
48 Ronald Gilson, Jeffrey Gordon, Roberta Karmel, Manning Warren, and Elliott Weiss 
submitted comments in support of the rule.   See Voting Rights Listing Standards - 
Disenfranchisement Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 25891 (July 7, 1988); see also Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of Rule 19c-4, 69 Wash. U. L. Q. 565 (1991); John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Toward the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market 
Competition on Corporate Governance, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1757 (2002); Manning Gilbert 
Warren III, One Share, One Vote: A Perception of Legitimacy, 14 J. Corp. L. 89, 93 n.36 (1988). 
49 See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (invalidating one-
share/one-vote rule as exceeding SEC authority and improperly intruding on state corporate law). 
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presently allow listed companies to issue nonvoting or limited-voting classes of shares, 
but with certain safeguards and restrictions.50 
During the most recent decade, market practices have continued to evolve, and the 
recent wave of financial innovation has once again transformed corporate voting 
practices.  Corporations have added new financial instruments – most without voting 
rights – to their capital structures, including various hybrid securities, tracking stocks, 
and securities whose voting rights depend on the length of a shareholder’s holding 
period.51  Meanwhile, market participants and regulators have become much more 
concerned with how corporate voting is affected by takeover defenses and proxy 
disclosure rules than with the rules allocating votes among shareholders. 
In general, one-share/one-vote remains the dominant practice and rule, with 
prominent exceptions.  However, the development of one-share/one-vote has not 
followed a simple evolutionary path.  The various rules and practices have instead 
evolved primarily in response to either a fear of regulation or direct regulatory initiative, 
as regulators (and scholars) argued that one-share/one-vote would properly align control 
and ownership.  In contrast, market pressures and regulatory competition among states 
and exchanges have pushed in the opposite direction, away from one-share/one-vote, as 
private parties have attempted to reallocate control away from ownership and states and 
exchanges have permitted corporations to reallocate voting control.  In other words, one-
share/one-vote is the majority rule notwithstanding market pressure and competition to 
the contrary.  One-share/one-vote remains a valuable default rule in many instances,52 but 
the characterization of the development of the rule as efficient historical practice is 
incomplete. 
                                                 
50 See, e.g., NYSE Listed Company Manual, 313.00(B)(1)-(3) Voting Rights (2004). 
51 Such arrangements have included, for example, allocating more votes to long-term 
shareholders than to short-term shareholders, presumably to discourage arbitrageurs from taking 
short-term speculative positions.  See, e.g., Potlatch Corporation, Restated Certificate of 
Incorporation (Form 10-K) (available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
79716/000103221003000293/dex3a.htm) § V (Sept. 27, 2002) (granting one vote per share held 
for less than 48 months and four votes per share for shares held 48 months or longer). 
52 Several studies have found that the one-share/one-vote regime has value.  See Rafael 
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants 
of External Finance, 52 J. Fin. 1131, 1142 (1997); Stijn Claessens, Simeon D. Djankov, Joseph 
P.H. Fan & Larry H.P. Lang, On Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence from East 
Asia (World Bank, Working Paper No. 2088, 1999) (http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract 
id=202390); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 
109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911, 1945 (1996); see also Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional 
Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781 (2000) (one-share/one-vote is 
among the rules important for controlling managerial self-dealing, because it limits the disparity 
between voting control and economic rights and will reduce insiders’ incentives to self-deal).  
Conversely, the absence of a one-share/one-vote rule has costs.  See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that 
Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 Cal L Rev 3, 60 
(1988) (“Given the flaws of shareholder voting, how can the firm provide convincing assurances 
that specific constraints, such as single class common, will have continuing effect?  In this 
context, the NYSE one share, one vote rule may be understood as a way of bonding the firm’s 
promise to maintain the single class capital structure without renegotiation.”); see also id. at 33-
36 (dual class recapitalizations generate significant negative returns upon announcement). 
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III. THE PROBLEM OF ENCUMBERED SHARES 
 
The history of corporate voting raises several unanswered questions about current 
(and future) practices and rules.  The prevailing public corporation approach to voting 
rights is in stark contrast to the innovative structures used by private corporations 53 and in 
the financial markets generally.  Moreover, the widespread use of equity derivatives, as 
well as a marked increase in share lending and shorting, have changed the economic 
profile of share-based portfolios.  In this Part, we address how such innovations have 
changed the analysis of voting of shares held by participants engaged in or affected by 
these new activities.  Specifically, we consider whether these activities “encumber” 
shares in ways that would justify moving further away from one-share/one-vote.  
 Shares can be encumbered in two ways.  First, shares can be paired with other 
portfolio positions such that the shareholder faces incentives different from those of a 
“pure” residual claimant.  We call such shares “economically encumbered.”  Second, 
shares can be associated with share lending transactions that distort the mechanics of 
shareholder voting.  We call such shares “legally encumbered.”  In either case, there are 
strong arguments that at least certain encumbered shares should not carry voting rights.  
Put another way, one-share/one-vote is arguably an inefficient rule when applied to such 
shareholdings. 
 
A. Economic Encumbrances 
 
Homogeneity of preferences is a key assumption in the law and economics model 
of corporate voting.  For example, Easterbrook and Fischel assume that each shareholder 
has equal incentive – proportional to share ownership – to maximize firm value.54  They 
conclude that the widespread practice of one-share/one-vote, as well as the prohibition on 
selling votes, follows from these assumptions.55  Conversely, Easterbrook and Fischel 
admit that if shareholders are not homogeneous in their preferences, then the efficiency 
justification of a one-share/one-vote rule does not hold.56 
 
 
                                                 
53 In contrast to public corporations, privately-held corporations – particularly those that 
seek venture capital – generally do not follow the practice or rule of one-share/one-vote.  Instead, 
privately-held corporations allocate voting rights in a custom tailored fashion, typically to various 
classes of preferred shareholders, depending on the amount and timing of their investment. 
54 Easterbrook & Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, at 69-71; 
Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, at 405 (“The preferences of one class of 
participants are likely to be similar if not identical.”). 
55 Easterbrook & Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, at 64-68 & 72-75; 
see also Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, at 409 (“Those with disproportionate 
voting power will not receive shares of the residual gains or losses from new endeavors and 
arrangements commensurate with their control; as a result they will not make optimal 
decisions.”). 
56 See Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, at 405 (“It is well known, 
however, that when voters hold dissimilar preferences it is not possible to aggregate their 
preferences into a consistent system of choices.”). 
15
Martin and Partnoy:
Published by Digital USD, 2004
 15
  1. A Taxonomy. 
The homogeneity assumption that underlies the one-share/one-vote rule, however, 
is untenable for several different reasons.  First, as abundant evidence demonstrates, 
shareholders as individuals are not homogeneous.  The behavioral finance literature has 
demonstrated that demand curves for financ ial assets often are downward sloping, and 
that shareholders accordingly have dramatically different preferences.57  Moreover, the 
empirical fact that shares with stronger voting rights are more valuable is inconsistent 
with assumed homogeneity. 58  If shareholders had uniform, expectations, they would 
(correctly) assume that their colleagues would vote the same way they would, and hence 
votes would have little or no value.  Conversely, shareholders with heterogeneous 
expectations would expect that their colleagues, if they controlled the firm, might act in 
ways contrary to their own interests, and therefore would believe preserving their vote is 
important (and valuable).59  The available evidence is thus inconsistent with alleged 
homogeneity. 
But one need not accept the behavioral finance arguments to conclude that certain 
shareholders do not face the same incentives as a pure residual shareholder.  With respect 
to economically encumbered shareholders, it is simply a matter of logic that these holders 
do not share preferences identical to those of non-encumbered shareholders; further, the 
traditional arguments in favor of granting voting rights to such shares do not apply.  The 
economic encumbrance argument is accordingly supported by – but does not depend on –
the findings of behavioral finance. 
The first, and simplest, example is of a shareholder with a short position that 
directly offsets her long position.  Suppose A and B each own ten shares, and C owns 
zero shares.  Then A and B have voting rights, but C does not.  Now suppose B decides 
she does not want to be exposed to the risks associated with these shares, but also does 
not want to or cannot sell her shares (perhaps because her shares were awarded as 
compensation but have not yet vested), so instead she sells short ten shares, borrowing 
them from her broker (who obtains them from the account of some other shareholder).  
The allocation of voting rights has not changed; A and B still vote, and C does not.  B 
retains a vote even though she now would be indifferent to a proposal that would increase 
the value of the corporation’s shares.  Put another way, B and C share the same economic 
incentives, but B has a vote while C does not. 
Moreover, B retains a vote even if her short position is for more shares than the 
number of shares she owns.  For example, even if B sold short twenty (or twenty 
thousand) shares, so that she would oppose a proposal that would increase the value of 
                                                 
57 See Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets:  An Introduction to Behavioral Finance 16-22 
(2000). 
58 Easterbrook & Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, at 71 (noting 
difference of two to four percent in value). 
59 Indeed, the fact that the price of stock falls on the record date relevant to a tender offer 
suggests that some shareholders (such as arbitrageurs or option holders) have starkly divergent 
interests in the vote, so that stock sold without the ability to counteract these competing interests 
through voting (i.e., stock sold after the record date) is worth less than stock with a vote. 
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the corporation’s shares – and would favor a proposal that would reduce the shares’ value 
– she nevertheless would retain the votes associated with the ten shares she owns.60 
Second, suppose B owns ten shares and purchases an at-the-money61 put option 
on ten shares.  Now, B’s incentives differ from A’s in two respects: (1) B has a limited 
downside – because of the insurance from the put option, she is indifferent as to decisions 
that would reduce the value of shares; and (2) B has different short- and long-run 
incentives.  Finance scholars have argued that maximizing short-term share value is no t a 
problematic corporate objective, because the short-term share price should reflect the net 
present value of longer-term future opportunities.  However, if shareholders differ as to 
how and when they would benefit from future events, they will follow different decision 
rules.  In this case, B would prefer to vote against a value increasing proposal now, even 
though she later would favor such a proposal after her put option had expired.  B 
similarly might vote against a value-enhancing opportunity now in order to preserve an 
alternative (competing) opportunity that would be less valuable to the firm but – because 
it might only appear only in the future – would result in an increase in stock value only 
after her put option had expired, thereby maximizing B’s (but not the corporation’s) 
expected return. 
Yet, in all of these examples, B retains the right to vote her ten shares, regardless 
of the size of her put position.  Even if she has a very substantial put position, so that she 
would benefit in the short run (i.e., before the exercise date) from a decline in the value of 
the shares, legal rules and prevailing corporate voting practices nevertheless permit her to 
vote.  Moreover, unlike in the first example where other shareholders (i.e., those who 
purchased the shorted shares) potentially receive a vote, net short put positions (i.e., those 
who sold the purchased puts) do not receive a vote.  The short put position might be 
offset by hedge transactions in the market for shares, or not.  As with short positions, 
there is the potential for inefficient strategic behavior.  For example, a controlling block 
of shareholders could purchase large quantities of put options, and then vote for a 
proposal that would reduce the value of the company’s shares.  Alternately, any 
                                                 
60 The question of whether purchasers of the shares that B has sold short also will obtain 
the right to vote is addressed in Part III.B.  Assuming they do not (or that if they do, then B will 
lose her vote), if there are no other derivatives transactions, there will be a net long position equal 
to the number of shares outstanding, regardless of the amount of shorting that occurs.  (We later 
relax this assumption, which in fact is false, but it is irrelevant for purposes of this analysis.)  
Accordingly, one can argue that if all shareholders vote, their preferences can be aggregated and 
the result will be an efficient one, just as if only net “pure” residual shareholders had voted.  
Unfortunately, there is no assurance that preferences can be so aggregated, particularly when 
there is uncertainty as to which shareholders will exercise their votes.  In the extreme case, if the 
pure residual shareholders are apathetic, corporate decisions could be governed by those whose 
interests favored reducing the value of shares.  At a minimum, close votes could be decided by 
the balance-tipping votes of shareholders with a net short position, and hence who have interests 
directly contrary to the majority of shareholders.  Additional explication of these issues is also 
contained in Part III.B. 
61 The example is further complicated by the possibility of B purchasing an in-the-money 
or out-of-the-money put option.  The more the put option is out-of-the-money (or less it is in-the-
money), the less B’s incentives will be aligned with those of shareholders.  A deep out-of-the-
money option would create incentives for B to favor proposals that would radically, if 
temporarily, reduce the value of shares, to below the (low) strike price. 
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shareholder with a very large put position and a relatively small equity stake would vote 
for proposals that would permanently reduce the value of the company, because the 
increase in the put position would more than outweigh the decline in her equity 
position. 62 
Third, suppose B owns ten shares and sells ten call options on those shares.63  As 
with puts, B’s incentives differ from A’s in two respects: (1) B has limited upside, which 
she relinquished in return for the call option premium, and therefore, other things equal, 
is indifferent as to decisions that would increase the value of shares; and (2) B has 
different short- and long-run incentives.  Now B would not favor proposals that would 
increase the value of shares, and would also oppose any proposal that would incur a non-
zero risk of a decline in the stock price in order to obtain a larger risk-adjusted increase in 
value.  Moreover, if B sold call options on more than ten shares, she would oppose such 
proposals, at least in the short run and (as with puts) perhaps in the long run as well.  
Moreover, the differential incentives would create similar opportunities for strategic 
behavior as those described above. 
Fourth, suppose B owns ten shares and sells ten put options on those shares.  
Now, B has “magnified” the incentives associated with her shares, with respect to 
downside risk.  In other words, B will be especially against proposals that might cause 
the share price to decline.  Again, B’s incentives differ from A’s in two respects: (1) B 
has (virtually64) unlimited downside with respect to her net short put position and hence 
will prefer to minimize the volatility associated with the value of shares, and (2) B has 
different short- and long-run incentives.  Because B has sold options, B essentially has 
sold volatility, the key determinant of an option’s value.  In the short run, B will want the 
value of the share price to be less volatile than a “pure” shareholder would want, because 
the value of her option becomes more negative as volatility increases.  B therefore will be 
more risk averse with respect to losses than would a typical shareholder.65 
 Fifth, suppose B owns ten shares and buys ten call options on those shares.  B has 
thereby magnified the incentives associated with her shares, with respect to upside risk.  
In other words, B will be especially eager to have the corporation undertake proposals 
that would cause the share price to rise.  Again, B’s incentives differ from A’s in two 
respects: (1) B has unlimited upside, with respect to the long call position, and therefore 
will prefer to maximize the volatility associated with the value of shares, and (2) B has 
different short- and long-run incentives.  Because B has bought options, B essentially has 
                                                 
62 Such a stockholder might, of course, economically prefer to own only the put position; 
however, because ownership of the equity stake may enhance her ability to maximize the value of 
her put position – e.g., because she can enhance the chance of a negative corporate event by 
voting for it – the decrease in the value of the stock that she owns is merely a cost of ensuring her 
larger economic benefit. 
63 Such a strategy is often referred to as covered call writing. 
64 B’s losses are limited only by the fact that the price of a share cannot decline below 
zero. 
65 This risk aversion is the opposite of that documented by numerous scholars, including 
most famously by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman.  See Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions , 59 J. Bus. 251 (1986); see also Robert 
C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical 
Law and Economics, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 23 (1989).  It is the structure of the portfolio position 
– not any aspect of human behavior – that generates this risk aversion. 
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bought volatility.  In the short run, B will want the value of the share price to be more 
volatile than a “pure” shareholder would want, because the value of her option becomes 
more positive as volatility increases.  B therefore will be more risk seeking with respect 
to gains than a typical shareholder would be.  Moreover, if B’s call position was larger 
than her equity position (e.g., B owned 10 shares but 10,000 calls), B might substantially 
prefer volatility-enhancing initiatives – thereby increasing the value of her calls – even if 
this enhanced volatility greatly diminished the value of the corporation and its stock. 
 Sixth, suppose the corporation has issued bonds66 in addition to stocks.  A 
shareholder who buys bonds will have different incentives from those of a pure 
shareholder because of the priority of bonds in the capital structure.  If one thinks of the 
shareholders as owning the assets of the corporation, 67 then the bondholders have sold a 
put option to the shareholders.  In this conceptualization, the shareholders have the right 
to sell the assets to the bondholders for an exercise price corresponding to a share price of 
zero (i.e., the face value of the bonds).  As noted above, a seller of a put option on the 
assets of the firm is more risk averse with respect to losses and less risk seeking with 
respect to gains.  Accordingly, if B owned a very large portfolio of bonds, she might 
oppose a proposal that would increase the value of her shares due to the associated risk to 
her bonds.  As with the put and call options examples, the differing incentives arise from 
optionality in the portfolio: because the bonds effectively are a short put option, they 
benefit from a reduction in volatility. 
Seventh, a shareholder who has shorted bonds will have negative incentives 
similar to those of a shareholder who has shorted stocks.  The major difference is that the 
short bond position benefits less from value-reducing proposals, and is harmed less from 
value-increasing proposals.  The short bond position is less volatile, and the incentives of 
such a shareholder are to reject proposals that would increase the value of shares, and to 
be less risk seeking than a pure shareholder.  
 2. Line-Drawing. 
 All of the above examples are ways in which shares can be encumbered such that 
they would no longer face incentives similar to those of residual claimants.  The 
assumptions of the law and economics literature on corporate voting do not hold with 
respect to such encumbered shares, and therefore the traditional argument in favor of 
giving them a vote is inapt.  Instead, from an incentive perspective, such shareholders 
arguably should be no more entitled to voting rights than other similarly situated non-
shareholders.  Put another way, giving voting rights to such shareholders results in an 
inefficient decision making process. 
 Of course, shareholders can be encumbered in a variety of other economic ways 
as well with respect to which the argument for depriving them of voting rights is weaker.  
For example, shares held by managers are encumbered because managers have relatively 
more human capital invested in the corporation than other shareholders, and are therefore 
more likely to have incentives similar to those of a bondholder.  Managers who also are 
call option holders are encumbered in that upside incentives might lead them to accept 
                                                 
66 A similar analysis would apply to the issuance of preferred shares or other intermediate 
hybrid securities. 
67 Alternatively, one can imagine that the bondholders own the assets of the corporation 
and have sold a call option to the shareholders.  The analysis would lead to similar conclusions. 
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proposals that would increase the volatility of the firm’s share price, at least in the short 
run, even though they would not increase the shares’ value. 
 A similar analysis could be performed for the corporation’s employees, suppliers, 
and others with relationships to the firm.  To the extent these parties are shareholders, 
they may face incentives that differ from those of traditional shareholders.  However, it 
would be very costly to undertake to make determinations as to which of these 
shareholders would face the appropriate incentives such that they should have votes.  
Instead, the cost-effective solution is to grant these shareholders voting rights, 
notwithstanding the fact that their incentives differ from those of a pure residual interest. 
 Ultimately, the question whether economically encumbered shares should be 
entitled to vote is an exercise in line drawing, to be resolved principally upon an analysis 
of transaction costs.  On one hand, corporate voting should be structured so that residual 
claimants have the general ability to control the corporation’s decisions, because they are 
the ones who gain or lose at the margin.  This argument suggests that those shareholders 
with encumbered positions should not be entitled to vote.  Permitting these shareholders 
to vote would lead to inefficient decisions, because they would favor proposals that 
would not maximize the value of the corporation. 
 On the other hand is the argument that any system of corporate voting should 
minimize not only agency costs, but also transaction costs.  One possible explanation for 
the persistence of one-share/one-vote, regardless of economic encumbrance, is that the 
process of deciding which shareholders should be entitled to receive a vote would be too 
costly under most circumstances.  It arguably would be quite expensive for corporations 
to engage in this practice on their own, especially with respect to encumbrances of 
employees, suppliers, and others with non-financial claims to the corporation’s profits. 
However, as the way shares are held has changed, it has become substantially 
cheaper to monitor the holdings of individuals.  Indeed, brokers engage in precisely this 
sort of monitoring already, and the SEC has assumed this kind of monitoring is possible 
in recent proposals regarding the nomination of corporate directors.  Commentators 
previously have considered the benefits and costs of having managers participate as 
shareholders, i.e., of having managers invested in the corporation.  The argument here is 
a corollary: depending on costs, perhaps some shareholders – including managers – 
should be divested instead. 
We hope here to begin the discussion of where the line should be drawn.  At 
minimum, shareholders with substantial short positions should not be entitled to vote.  
Such a limitation could be implemented at relatively low cost.  Brokers can and do keep 
records for each shareholder, including details about portfolio positions.  Brokers could 
communicate this information to share depositories and proxy firms at relatively low 
cost.  Indeed, as we discuss in Part III.B., these institutions already should be determining 
whether shares are legally encumbered, and could use this information to identify shares 
that are economically encumbered. 
Our preliminary conclus ions are that corporations and their regulators should 
strongly consider taking away the votes of options buyers and sellers, but should not 
divest employees or suppliers of their votes.  But whatever the conclusion, it seems clear 
that the assumption of shareholder homogeneity does not hold, and therefore, wherever 
the line is to be drawn, it should not be at one-share/one-vote. 
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B. Legal Encumbrances 
 
 In addition to being economically encumbered, shares can be – and frequently are 
– legally encumbered, particularly through lending and shorting arrangements.68  Lending 
and shorting create uncertainty about whether voting rights attach to particular shares; 
questions arise as to whether shareholders whose shares have been loaned out maintain 
their voting rights, and also whether shareholders who have purchased shorted shares 
acquire voting rights.69  Difficulties also arise regarding the manner in which brokers vote 
on behalf of shareholders, particularly broker nonvotes.70  These legal encumbrances 
have gone largely unnoticed in the literature and in practice, primarily because both 
shareholders and academics simply assume that they in fact maintain the voting rights 
attached to shares they purchase or own. 71 
  1. The Generation of Legal Encumbrances. 
Stock lending and shorting generate several important benefits, including 
improved market liquidity and pricing efficiency. 72  Although legislators periodically 
raise concerns about short selling, scholars generally have opposed its regulation.  
However, scholarly debate has centered on extant restrictions on shorting, not on the 
effects of shorting on voting rights.73 
In 1991, the House Committee on Government Operations released a report on 
short selling, finding that the “effects of short selling on the securities markets are not 
                                                 
68 These arrangements involve very substantial numbers of shares.  The average short 
interest on the NYSE during 2003 was approximately eight billion shares, roughly two percent of 
total shares.  See www.nyse.com/press. 
69 The practices didn’t matter until the demand for stock borrowing was spurred by new 
trading strategies and arbitrage, beginning in the 1980s.  U.S. custodian banks began lending 
stocks to brokers on behalf of their clients.  In these lending transactions, voting rights were 
transferred.   Regulators in England have explicitly recognized this problem: “Stock lending 
involves the absolute transfer of title to both the securities lent and the collateral taken and any 
voting rights are transferred along with title.  Stock must therefore be recalled by the lender, or 
collateral substituted by the borrower, if they wish to exercise voting rights attaching to particular 
securities.”  Stock Borrowing and Lending Code of Guidance, Bank of England, December 2000, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/stockborrowing.pdf.   
70 Brokers generally are entitled to lend securities.  A typical provision of margin account 
terms and conditions states: “[Broker] is authorized to lend any securities held on margin in my 
account(s) to itself as broker or to others, unless and until Ameritrade receives written notice of 
revocation from me.”  Ameritrade Terms at Conditions at 112 (2003). 
71 See Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 
1427 (1964). 
72 Securities lending not only permits shorting, but also provides liquidity for the 
covering of options or other arbitrage positions, and avoids delivery failures and settlement 
defaults.  The computerized program trading and arbitrage strategies that dominate the trading of 
stocks globally would not be possible without securities lending. 
73 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Mark Mitchell, & Jeffrey Netter, Restrictions on Short 
Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock Market 
Crash, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 799 (1989); see also Michael R. Powers, David Schizer & Martin 
Shubik, Market Bubbles and Wasteful Avoidance: Tax and Regulatory Constraints on Short 
Sales, available at www.ssrn.com (2003). 
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widely understood,” and asking the SEC to examine the issue.74  The SEC undertook to 
study short sale practices, but did not specifically consider the effects of short sales on 
corporate voting.  In response to the SEC’s request for comments, a few individuals 
asked the SEC to clarify the circumstances under which the purchaser of shorted shares 
can vote.75  Their expressed concern was that they did not know when they bought shares 
if they had been sold short or borrowed.  The SEC did not address these concerns, and 
instead determined that no action was necessary with respect to short sales.76  During the 
past decade, the SEC has continued its policy of not regulating the voting of shares sold 
short.77 
The tension between shorting and lending on one hand, and voting rights on the 
other, arises from the complex interaction of clearing and brokerage, with shares being 
held in “street name” on behalf of shareholders through brokers, who are members of, 
and in turn hold shares through, the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, the 
primary holder of record (with the nominee name Cede and Co.) for most securities.78  
Through a subsidiary, the National Securities Clearing Corporation, DTCC provides to its 
members the Continuous Net Settlement System, an automated book-entry accounting 
system that centralized the settlement of securities transactions.79  DTCC members settle 
                                                 
74 Short-Selling Activity in the Stock Market: Market Effects and the Need for Regulation 
(Part 1) (House Report), H.R. Rep. No. 102-414 (1991), reprinted in CCH Federal Securities Law 
Reports Number 1483 Part II (1992). 
 75 See Letter from Don E. Sprague to the SEC, File No. S7-24-99, Jul. 8, 2001 
(available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s72499/sprague1.txt) (“When an investor 
purchases a short sold stock, they must be informed that they do not have voting rights since they 
purchased short sold stock.  The purchaser must be informed that the short may be covered at a 
later date and they will then hold real stock with voting rights.”). 
76 The SEC originally sought comments on the practice of “street name” voting in 1977.  
See SEC Release No. 34-13482 (Apr. 28, 1977); see also SEC Release No. 34-13901 (Aug. 29, 
1977).  The source of the SEC’s initial concern was a report detailing the voting practices of 
brokers holding securities on behalf of their customers.  See The Final Report of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission on the Practice of Recording the Ownership of Securities in the 
Records of the Issuer in Other Than the Name of the Beneficia l Owner of Such Securities 13-15 
(December 3, 1976).  The SEC noted in this report that brokers were voting shares without voting 
instructions, invariably in favor of management, but concluded that this practice was proper, in 
part because NYSE Rule 452 contained sufficient limitations on such voting.  Id. at 8.  It does not 
appear that this view has changed. 
77 Recently, the SEC has proposed changes in two areas related to shareholder voting: 
enhanced disclosure related to committees nominating director candidates and enhanced access of 
certain shareholders to the director nomination process.  See SEC Release No. 34-48301 (Aug. 8, 
2003) (disclosure); SEC Release No. 34-48626 (Oct. 14, 2003) (access).  The enhanced access 
proposal involves triggering a nomination process at the request of a “one percent” shareholder, 
and permitting nomination by a “five percent” shareholder (for a two-year period).  Such a 
shareholder would be required to certify compliance with such a threshold (e.g., “By signing 
below, I further certify that __% of the securities referred to above have been held continuously 
for at least 2 years.”) 
78 See http://www.dtcc.com/.  DTCC’s clients include more than 2,500 brokers, dealers, 
banks, mutual funds, insurance carriers, and other organizations, each of whom has an account at 
DTCC. 
79 See http://www.dtcc.com/ProductsAndServices/clearing/cns.html. 
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their transactions with NSCC through CNS three days after the trade date, the date on 
which their clients buy or sell securities.  CNS long positions represent securities owed 
by NSCC to member participants; CNS short positions represent securities owed by 
members to NSCC.   
For short positions, NSCC has established a Stock Borrow Program, through 
which member participants may lend excess securities in their DTCC account to NSCC’s 
account at DTCC.  NSCC has implemented various procedures to ensure that its short 
sale delivery obligations through CNS are satisfied, if they cannot be satisfied through 
normal delivery of shares.  NSCC pays overnight interest to members who lend securities 
to NSCC to cover temporary shortfalls.  Securities on loan to NSCC are recorded as long 
positions in a special CNS account dedicated to the member’s Stock Borrow Program. 
Because DTCC (through Cede and Co.) is the holder of record for most securities, 
it also is entitled to the voting rights associated with those securities.  DTCC passes on its 
voting rights to official record holders (e.g., brokers) through an omnibus proxy listing 
each member participant’s closing balance as of the record date, and thereby assigning 
the voting rights associated with shares as of the record date.  A broker then assigns the 
voting rights to individual shareholders, who either vote (in person or by proxy) or not.80 
This complex process interacts with lending and shorting practices to produce 
surprising results.  For example, when individuals buy or own shares, they typically have 
no way of knowing whether the shares have been loaned or shorted.81  Short sellers 
borrow shares from brokers, who obtain those shares from other shareholders’ margin 
accounts.82  Whereas the shorting party can, and does, undertake to pay any dividend 
declared by the corporation, the shorting party cannot similarly undertake to transfer 
voting rights.83  Consequently, because there are only a finite number of votes, when a 
                                                 
80 Brokers enter into agreements with proxy agent and solicitation firms to assist with the 
distribution and counting of shareholder proxies.  Scholars have been critical of the role of these 
firms (which include, most prominently, ADP Shareholder Services and Institutional Shareholder 
Services, and are not regulated by SEC) in the voting process.  See Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R. 
Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 485, 510-11 (1994).  
ADP has been accused of miscounting proxies and sending proxies out late (or not at all), and 
institutional investors have urged the SEC to review proxy distribution practices, to little avail. 
81 In order for a shareholder to assure she will be able to vote shares, she must either not 
have them in a margin account (i.e., not permit the broker to lend the shares) or she must ask the 
broker to put the shares into the cash side of her account before the record date of the vote.  
Although individuals can prevent shares from being loaned by following this approach, they still 
will not know whether the shares they hold in a cash account previously were loaned and shorted. 
82 The shorting shareholder’s account is credited with the proceeds from the sale.  
Depending on the relationship between the shorting party and the broker, the shorting party may 
receive margin interest on the funds from the short sale.  If the shareholder is a good customer or 
has collateral in the account, the broker may agree to more favorable interest payment terms.  For 
shorting, institutional investors bid down the interest rate to low levels.  They have a comparative 
advantage over individuals in selling short.  If the stock price increases, the broker typically 
requires the shorting party to post additional collateral. 
83 In other words, all share positions are entitled to both dividends and voting rights.  The 
corporation avoids paying additional dividends on loaned and shorted shares by having the 
shorting party pay dividends to the shareholder.  Cash is fungible so that a shorting party can pay 
dividends from other assets.  But voting is not fungible and a shorting party with no 
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shareholder permits a share to be borrowed for shorting, she essentially creates a new 
shareholder.  Share lending thereby creates the illusion that there are more shares owned 
beneficially than are actually registered.84   
The last buyer of shares in the chain of lending and shorting is the final 
shareholder of record, and only that person technically should have the right to vote.85  
All previous beneficial owners of shares in the chain technically are not shareholders of 
record, and therefore should not have a voting right.  In this way, predecessor shares (i.e., 
holders of shares that have been loaned out) can be said to be “legally encumbered.”  As 
with economically encumbered shares, legally encumbered shares arguably should not 
have a vote.86 
                                                                                                                                                 
corresponding shares entitled to vote will not be able to “pay” a vote to a share purchaser.  Nor 
will the corporation want to dilute votes by permitting new shares to vote.  As a result, both the 
initial owner of a share and also the later purchaser of a loaned and shorted share (and any other 
purchasers of loaned shares, depending on how many times the shares are loaned) each will 
expect to have a vote.  This situation is problematic; if every long share position voted, there 
would be more votes than shares.  See Canada Business Corporations Act Discussion Paper:  
Shareholder Communications and Proxy Solicitation Rules ¶ 75 at 17 (August 1995) (available at  
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/cl/sc-eng.pdf) (“The reality is that more than one proxy can be issued 
for the same shares when two or more shareholders feel that they have the right to vote them. 
This, in turn, can cause the number of proxies delivered by an intermediary to exceed the number 
of shares registered in the name of that intermediary. This may lead to adjustments to proxy 
tabulated votes that would affect a voting decision.”); see also id. ¶ 77 at 18 (“Because of the 
large volume of loaned securities in the marketplace on any given day, the possibility of 
overvoting seems always to be present.”). 
84 Suppose A buys a share, which is then loaned through A’s broker to a shorting party.  
The shorting party sells the share to B.  The share again is loaned through to another shorting 
party, who sells to C.  And so on.  Each buyer considers herself to be a shareholder.  Yet at 
DTCC, there is only one share, with only one vote. 
85 SEC and NYSE rules provide that one may vote only shares in one’s “possession and 
control.”  See SEC Rule 15c3-3; NYSE Rule 452 (“A member organization shall give or 
authorize the giving of a proxy for stock registered in its name, or in the name of its nominee, at 
the direction of the beneficial owner.  If the stock is not in the control or possession of the 
member organization, satisfactory proof of the beneficial ownership as of the record date may be 
required.”).  Accordingly, the lender formally loses the right to vote shares that are loaned 
because she is not in “possession and control” of those shares.  The specifics are governed by 
standardized brokerage industry agreements, although an informal survey of brokers indicates 
that these agreements are not followed. 
86 The opposite result – or at least a variant – arises from a “naked short,” in which the 
shorting party sells a share without first borrowing the share.  In such cases, the buyer of the share 
from the short should not have a vote because she has essentially purchased a synthetic share, 
which does not have any voting rights borrowed from an actual share.  The fact that buyers have 
no way of knowing whether they have purchased their share from a short or from an actual owner 
only further complicates matters.  Naked short selling is prohibited by the major exchanges, but is 
pervasive in the over the counter market, and the SEC is presently considering a regulation to 
prohibit the practice.  See SEC Release No. 34-48709 (Nov. 3, 2003) (available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48709.htm). 
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Two conditions must be satisfied in order for legally encumbered shares to be 
voted, as they currently are, without leading to overvoting.87  First, only a fraction of 
shareholders can vote.  If every shareholder voted, then brokers would be forced to 
deprive legally encumbered shares of their vote.  Second, brokers must reallocate votes 
among shares.88  When two parties each submit proxies related to the same share, the 
broker must find (or borrow) a nonvoting share and allocate that vote to one of the voting 
parties.  This fictional reallocation of shares prevents more than one vote being attributed 
to an individual share.89  If brokers did not reallocate shares in this manner, shareholders 
interested in preserving their voting rights would withdraw their shares, exacerbating any 
reduction in short-term liquidity.   
Before the introduction of single-stock futures,90 an argument could be made that 
liquidity concerns justified substituting the actual legal rights of shareholders to vote with 
the fictional regime described above.  But such an argument is inapplicable today.  
Instead, any liquidity effects from denying the vote of legally encumbered shares would 
be minimized by the ability of parties to sell single-stock futures to create a economic 
short share position.  In fact, restricting – or even halting – lending and shorting of shares 
might reduce costs and improve liquidity, by forcing investors away from the path-
                                                 
87 Before the introduction of the DTCC procedures described above, overvoting was a 
serious problem (and remains a problem outside the United States – Canada is one example).  
Since the 1980s, stock lending transactions have been recorded at DTCC specifically as borrows 
and loans, making overvoting technically impossible (at least DTCC; it remains possible at the 
broker level).  DTCC submits reports to its members twice per day indicating which positions are 
shares and which are loans.  It is up to the broker (or the broker’s agency) to send proxy materials 
to, and to submit votes only on behalf of, only shareholders of record on the record date.  In other 
words, the risk is not of formal overvoting, which DTCC procedures prevent, but of creating the 
expectations of a vote among more shares than there are votes, as well as ensuring that any votes 
cast are voted by individuals actually entitled to do so. 
 88 Anecdotal evidence suggests that brokers do not take care to ensure that each share is 
voted only once, or that shareholders with shares in margin accounts are informed that their 
shares have been loaned out and that they might not have a vote (even though they have been sent 
a proxy and proxy materials).  Brokers instead send voting proxies to all shareholders of record, 
regardless of whether the shares they hold have been loaned out and sold short.  See Letter from 
Bill Hawes to the SEC, File No. S7-24-99, Dec. 8, 2000 (available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s72499/hawes1.txt)  (“Currently the issue of voting rights for 
short-sold shares is not regulated by the SEC, and the common practice by brokerage institutions 
is to forward voting proxies to all shareholders of record, even if their shares have been (in all or 
part) loaned out and sold short.  This practice leads to the situation in which more shares are 
eligible for a proxy vote than are currently outstanding for the company, due to the diluting effect 
of short-selling. The presence of these additional votes could possibly distort the results of 
shareholder voting.”).  In addition, brokers typically do not disallow votes by legally encumbered 
shares.  If they did, shareholders who cared about voting would not permit their shares to be 
loaned, and market liquidity would decline.   
89 If brokers did so, then fewer shareholders would permit their shares to be loaned, and 
liquidity would suffer.  Alternatively, shareholders would transfer shares from margin to cash 
accounts before the record date, to preserve their votes, leading to sharp declines in liquidity just 
prior to the record date. 
90 Single-stock futures were illegal until passage of the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). 
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dependent lending and shorting approach to a more sensible, lower-cost approach they 
otherwise might not undertake (because switching costs are too high).  Now that single-
stock futures are available, regulators could encourage their use, establish voting 
practices consistent with law, and reduce costs by restricting or prohibiting lending and 
shorting, and encourage trading of economically equivalent single-stock futures.  Indeed, 
because the margin requirements for single-stock futures are lower than those for 
shorting, the markets likely would shift from shorting if differential costs were 
introduced. 
2. The Effect of Legal Encumbrances. 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of legally encumbered shares is how few 
shareholders and brokers understand the potential limitations on voting.  For example, 
there is no price differential between shares that have been loaned and shares that have 
not.  Indeed, there is no effort made to distinguish among shares based on whether they 
have been loaned.  These facts indicate either that shareholders do not understand the 
process of loaning shares, or that they do not care.  If shareholders understood and cared 
about voting rights, a market practice easily could evolve where loaned shares would 
carry a particular label, so that shareholders would know whether someone else is holding 
their shares.  But no such practice exists. 
If the voting of legally encumbered shares were restricted, shareholders would be 
more likely to protect their votes, to the extent they cared about them, by calling shares in 
from margin accounts to cash accounts, from which brokers are not permitted to loan.  
Brokers then would not need to redistribute votes surreptitiously or cancel the votes of 
shareholders whose shares have been loaned out.  Voting restrictions on legally 
encumbered shares could be imposed either by regulators or by the market; if regulators 
simply enforced basic contract law principles governing voting rights, market practices 
likely would evolve to prevent vote shifting. 
As with economically encumbered shares, legally encumbered shares thus 
undermine the efficiency rationale for one-share/one-vote.91  If the original shareholder is 
not economically encumbered, she – according to the standard law and economics 
argument – should have a voting right.  Yet each share carries only one vote.  The current 
approach of giving such shareholders a phantom vote works only because so few 
shareholders vote, and therefore current practice is an unstable equilibrium.  The one-
share/one-vote rule is not applied to give each share one vote. 
Further, like the voting of economically encumbered shares, the voting of legally 
encumbered shares is subject to manipulation.  Indeed, the practices of lending and 
shorting can facilitate such activities.  Suppose a company has issued 100 shares, and that 
A owns 20 of those shares and has an 80 share short position.  Further suppose that A 
would like to press for a vote opposed by all of the other shareholders (and the holders of 
the 80 shares purchased from A in the short sale, which were borrowed from the original 
shareholders), because it will depress the share price.  A can borrow and short an 
                                                 
91 They also present systemic concerns.  Recently, a clearing firm nearly failed after one 
of its broker clients failed to deliver $60 million in exchange for borrowed stock.  See Securities 
& Exchange Comm’n v. D’Angelo (Complaint filed Sept. 11, 2003) (available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18344.htm).  MJK Clearing suspended operations 
when Native Nations Securitie s failed to deliver cash for borrowed stock in GenesisIntermedia.  
Ten NYSE member firms were left holding stock in the firm.  Id. 
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additional 80 shares, buying back all 80 of those shares through a related party.  A would 
still have a net negative position in the corporation’s shares.  But now A arguably would 
have not only the 20 votes associated with her original share position, but an additional 
80 votes associated with the shares purchased from her own shorting transactions.  There 
are now 180 shares that arguably have votes, of which A holds 100.  Even if every share 
voted, an unlikely event given widespread shareholder apathy, A would win a majority.   
Such practices might be difficult to orchestrate in the shares of the largest publicly 
held corporations, but thinly traded stocks are more easily susceptible to such activity.  If 
shareholders believe such activity might take place, they will be less willing to purchase 
such stocks, resulting in a higher cost of capital overall and a less efficient market.  If 
only the final shareholder of record were permitted to vote, these incentives for 
manipulation would not exist.92 
 A final problem associated with the current system of voting is the way in which 
brokers vote on non-discretionary matters and submit nonvotes.  Shares can be thought to 
be legally encumbered in additional ways, based on the exercise power of the broker to 
vote those shares. 
Recall that the voting of “street name” shares by brokers is governed by the 
various stock exchanges.93  The exchanges give brokers discretion to vote street name 
stock, unless the beneficial owner gives specific instructions to the contrary or the vote is 
important.94  These rules developed as more shares became held in street name, and 
managers expressed concern that if brokers were not permitted to vote shares on behalf of 
clients, few corporations could satisfy their quorum requirements (generally set at fifty 
percent of the eligible votes).95  Under Delaware law, abstentions count toward a 
                                                 
92 On the other hand, parties can use single -stock futures to purchase votes, by purchasing 
shares and simultaneously selling an equivalent number of single -stock futures.  Accordingly, a 
legally encumbered share rule is necessary, but not sufficient, to prevent such manipulation.  To 
deter such practices, economically encumbered shares (e.g., a share plus the sale of a single -stock 
futures) also should be deprived of votes.  
93 See 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide at 2451-2452; 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide at 9528-9529; NASD 
Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, § 1, Interpretation. 05, Section 4, NASD Manual 2151.05 at 2038.  
NYSE Rule 452 states: “A member organization may give or authorize the giving of a proxy to 
vote any stock registered in its name, or in the name of its nominee, if such member organization 
holds such stock as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or in a similar representative or 
fiduciary capacity with authority to vote.”  Neither state nor federal law sets forth specific rules 
governing the relationship between the beneficial owner of shares and her broker, or record 
owner.  See American Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 136 A.2d 690 (Del. 1957). 
94 For example, a merger is considered an important event, and brokers are not permitted 
to vote at their discretion for or against a merger.  See, e.g.,New York Stock Exchange Rule 
452.11 (“Generally speaking, a member organization may not give a proxy to vote without 
instructions from beneficial owners when the matter to be voted upon: . . . (3) relates to a merger . 
. . .”) 
95 Delaware corporation law states a quorum is “a majority of the shares entitled to vote, 
present in person or by proxy” unless the statute, charter, or by-laws provide otherwise.  The 
statute provides that the charter and by-laws may not lower the quorum below one-third of 
shareholders entitled to vote.  Obtaining a quorum is no longer as difficult for most large public 
corporations, because most shares are held by institutions, many of which have a fiduciary duty to 
vote, and typically do.   
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quorum.96  Thus, shareholders who are present at a meeting (through their broker) are 
properly counted in determining a quorum even if they do not vote their shares.   
Votes on proxy ballots are separated into matters that are “routine” or “non-
routine.”  For routine proposals, brokers have discretion and may vote shares held in 
street name if investors fail to vote (or the broker may abstain from voting).  For non-
routine proposals, brokers lack discretion to vote shares, but may submit a “nonvote.”  
Abstentions are counted as votes against any proposal that must pass with an affirmative 
vote of the majority of the votes cast.  Non-votes are counted as votes against any 
proposal that must pass with an affirmative vote of a majority of all outstanding shares.  
These voting rules make it more difficult for shareholder proposals to pass, and 
favor management to the extent brokers are voting in place of shareholders.  For example, 
Jennifer E. Bethel and Stuart L. Gillan found that routine management proposals receive 
eight percent more favorable votes than non-routine proposals, and 10.3 percent higher 
voter turnout.97  Anecdotal evidence, including letters to the SEC, also supports the 
notion that the practice of broker voting favors management over shareholders.98 
Although the SEC has expressed concern that management’s abuse of broker 
voting rules was not only making it more difficult for shareholder proposals to pass, but 
also was resulting in some shareholder proposals drawing more yes votes than no votes, 
                                                 
96 In 1988, the Delaware Supreme Court interpreted Section 216 of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law to provide that the number of shares “counted” for quorum purposes need not 
necessarily be the same as the number of shares required to be “present” for voting purposes.  See 
Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552 A.2d 482 (Del. 1988).  Section 216 provides in relevant part: 
“Subject to this chapter in respect of the vote that shall be required for a specified action, the 
certificate of incorporation or bylaws of any corporation authorized to issue stock may specify the 
number of shares and/or the amount of other securities having voting power the holders of which 
shall be present or represented by proxy at any meeting in order to constitute a quorum for, and 
the votes that shall be necessary for, the transaction of any business, but in no event shall a 
quorum consist of less than one-third of the shares entitled to vote at the meeting.”  8 Del. C. § 
216 (Supp. 1988). 
97 See Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, The Impact of the Institutional and 
Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting, 34 Fin. Mgmt. 29, 29-54 (2002); see also James 
Hanks Jr., Disclosure of Vote Requirements and the Treatment of Abstentions and Broker Non-
Votes Under the Proxy Rules, 12 Insights: Corporate & Securities Law Advisor 24-28 (1999). 
98 “Uninstructed broker votes significantly distort the voting process.  Brokers routinely 
deliver votes overwhelmingly in favor of management on issues of increasing importance to 
shareholders – without ever consulting their clients.  Investors no longer view many formerly 
mundane votes, such as election of directors and ratification of auditors, as routine votes, and yet 
the NYSE continues to permit broker votes on these issues.  The one rationale purporting to 
justify uninstructed broker votes – the need to meet a quorum – has become open to question in 
light of recent research.  If the NYSE inquiry suggests a need to continue uninstructed broker 
votes for quorum purposes, the Exchange should limit broker voting solely to quorum votes.” 
Public Comment of Institutional Shareholder Services to SEC dated October 31, 2002 (available 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse200246/pmcgurn1.htm).  In 1998, brokers cast votes to make 
the margin of victory for more than half of 285 stock plans that faced significant opposition.  In 
one vote in 1999, Venator reported 6.1 million broker nonvotes as present on two proposals 
where exchange rules prevented brokers from voting.  David Henry, Shareholder Votes Fall 
Through Loophole , USA Today, Aug. 26, 1999 (citing study by Strategic Compensation 
Research Associates). 
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but still losing, the SEC has not attempted substantive regulation in this area (in large part 
because of the judicial finding that the SEC had exceeded its statutory authority in 
promulgating Rule 19c-4).  Instead, since 1993 federal regulations have required 
registrants to disclose details of their voting procedures, including the vote counting 
method and the effect of abstentions and broker nonvotes on shareholder proposals.99  
Corporations now typically disclose to shareholders that they must obtain a majority of 
shares voting and abstaining to prevail on a proposal. 100  The rationale for the disclosure 
approach is similar to the efficient market rationale assumed in other areas of securities 
regulation. 
As with practices related to other encumbered shares, broker voting practices are 
subject to manipulation and do not reflect overall shareholder preferences.  For example, 
managers might state that a proposal required a majority of shares “present” at the 
shareholders’ meeting.  According to this formulation, if a shareholder did not vote, but 
her broker was “present,” her votes would be counted in the denominator, making it more 
difficult for a proposal to pass.  Suppose there are 100 shares outstanding, all held in 
street name, half of which are voted.  Further suppose there is a shareholder proposal 
favored by the vast majority of shareholders, but opposed by management (and brokers).  
Of the 50 shareholder votes, 49 are in favor of the proposal; only one is against.  The 50 
shares that are not voted, but held in street name, are counted as nonvotes.  The proposal 
fails 51 to 49.   
The New York Stock Exchange recently has considered changes broker voting 
rules with respect to shareholder approval of equity compensation plans and director 
nomination procedures.  The responses to the compensation proposal indicate that 
corporations and institutional investors generally oppose changes to the rules, while 
individual shareholders remain largely unaware of broker voting practices.101  Similar 
arguments have arisen in the debate about shareholder nominations of corporate 
                                                 
99 17 C.F.R. 14a-101 Items 21 (a)-(b) (1993); 17 C.F.R. Schedule 14A, Item 21(a)-(b). 
100 If markets were efficient with respect to information about voting, this disclosure 
would be sufficient to remedy any flaws in the system of broker voting. 
101 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. 
Relating to Shareholder Approval of Equity Compensation Plans and the Voting of Proxies, SEC 
Release No. 34-46620 (Oct. 8, 2002):  “B. Elimination of Broker Voting.  The Exchange 
represents that the institutional investor community gave strong support to this proposal.  Many 
large companies, however, strongly urged the NYSE to maintain its existing rules, fearing 
primarily the increased proxy costs and increased uncertainty that the proposed change would 
entail.  Large and small companies alike cited quorum difficulties and solicitation expenses that 
result when brokers are not allowed to vote uninstructed shares after a 10-day period.  One such 
commentator warned that because of retail investor confusion about voting mechanics, there is a 
risk that the elimination of the discretionary broker vote will disenfranchise investors if not 
accompanied by an aggressive and vigorous program to educate them about how to vote their 
shares.  Many commentators also expressed concern that institutional shareholders may simply 
vote their shares in accordance with strict internal or third-party guidelines or policies, rather than 
giving each plan individual consideration.  One organization suggested proportional or mirror 
voting by brokers of uninstructed shares.”).  In a 1998 survey of individual investors, 77 percent 
were unaware that brokers could vote their shares 
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directors.102  The above discussion suggests that these proposals should be responsive to 
the limitations on voting that arise from the encumbrances of shares. 
 
IV. NON-SHARE POSITIONS AND VOTING RIGHTS 
 
 In Part III, we demonstrated that shares can be encumbered economically or 
legally, and therefore arguably should not be entitled to vote, at least in certain instances.  
In this Part, we consider the converse claim as to non-share positions with economic 
interests identical to that of a pure residual interest holder.  The pure residual interest 
holder is entitled to a vote based on her economic incentives; we consider whether 
economically equivalent non-share positions also should have votes. 
 One powerful argument against giving a vote to non-shareholders is that they 
have no direct relationship with the corporation.  They have not purchased any stake in 
the corporation, and therefore should not be involved in its governance.  At first glance, 
this argument might seem dispositive.  After all, shouldn’t the lack of a formal link with 
the corporation be more important than the economic incentives facing the investor?  
Moreover, if votes were allocated to anyone facing the incentives of an economic residual 
positions, the number of votes would be indeterminate and might become unmanageably 
large; the corporation would lose control of the voting process and managers and 
shareholders would find it difficult to know which constituents would control the voting 
process at a particular point.  Voting would be even more susceptible to manipulation that 
it already is. 
Notwithstanding this argument, under certain circumstances, non-shareholders 
with residual exposure to the company’s stock price are more appropriately in the role of 
“shareholders” – with a vote – than (encumbered) shareholders themselves.  For example, 
it is conceivable that every share could be so encumbered that no shareholder should be 
entitled to vote.  Suppose that every shareholder also had a short position not involving a 
short sale (i.e., involving options or single-stock futures).103  The true residual claims to 
the corporation’s cash flows in such a setting would have been shifted away from shares 
to derivative contracts, so that the parties in the economic residual position were no 
longer shareholders.  If one “real” shareholder were to unwind her short position, so that 
she was in a “pure” residual position, she would prefer to assign votes to the non-
shareholders with residual- like interests than to other shareholders.  In other words, 
                                                 
102 See Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Perspective on Shareholder Nominations of 
Corporate Directors, Harvard Olin Discussion Paper No. 429 (2003); Lucian Bebchuk, The Case 
for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 Bus. Lawyer 43 (2003); Martin Lipton & Steven 
Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy:  An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 
Bus. Lawyer 67 (2003). 
103 Consider a simple example of a corporation with 100 shares.  Suppose all of the shares 
are held by individuals who also have sold a like number of single -stock futures, so that their 
residual economic interest in the shares is cancelled by their single -stock futures position.  Then, 
all of the shareholders of the corporation would be indifferent to any actions taken by the 
corporation.  Instead, the holders of single -stock futures would have the greatest economic 
interest.  They would be in the economic position shareholders are assumed to hold: these non-
shareholders would receive most of the marginal gains, and incur most of the marginal losses, of 
the corporation’s decisions.  Accordingly, these non-shareholders – rather than the actual 
shareholders – should have the appropriate incentives to make discretionary decisions.   
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depending on the degree and type of trading, the economic residual interest of a 
corporation might not reside with shareholders (contrary to Easterbrook & Fischel’s 
assumptions); instead, it could reside with holders of options portfolios, single-stock 
futures, or other equity derivatives. 
Moreover, the number of non-shareholders with votes could be limited by 
permitting only those non-shareholders who can trace their positions directly to a voting 
share.  For example, the counterparty to a short position executed by a true shareholder 
would be entitled to a vote, but the counterparty to a short position executed by someone 
who did not have the legal right to vote would not (e.g., if that share were legally 
encumbered).  If the short position were executed on an exchange, the exchange could 
“acquire” only the number of votes that could be traced to the shorting party.  For 
example, a single-stock futures exchange might trade millions of futures contracts, but 
only a handful of contracts that were entitled to vote.  Just as shares could be labeled as 
loaned or not, single-stock futures could be labeled as entitled to vote or not. 
 In other words, the objection to giving a vote to non-shareholders with an 
economic residual interest is different from that typically given in the literature.  Instead, 
such parties do not receive a vote, notwithstanding their residual position, because the 
cost of tracing individual positions to individual votes is too high.  It is unclear whether 
the cost in fact is too high today, although the fact that corporations do not permit (or 
encourage) the shifting of votes to derivatives contracts is some evidence of the cost.  
Nevertheless, as the costs of financial contracting continue to decline, it will at some 
point become cost effective to assign votes to an economic residual interest, regardless of 
that interest’s connection to the corporation, so long as the interest can be traced to a 
voting right, so that the number of votes does not exceed the number of shares. 
If it is too costly to find the residual interest most directly connected to the 
corporation (e.g., through the purchase of shorted shares), it then would be an efficient 
solution to give shareholders a vote, even though their economic incentives are not the 
same as the residual interest.  But this rationale for voting practices is quite different from 
that articulated in the literature.  Instead, this reasoning augurs in favor of giving votes to 
shareholders in spite of their economic incentives. 
Moreover, a firm’s capital structure affects the assigning of votes, so that non-
shareholders in one firm can occupy the equivalent position of shareholders of an 
identical firm (except for capital structure).  It would seem odd to assign votes to one 
group of shareholders, but not to an equivalent group on non-shareholders, merely 
because of form.  Indeed, if the law and economics argument about allocation of voting 
rights is correct, the assigning of votes should be invariant to capital structure.  But if the 
assigning of votes is invariant to capital struc ture, then the voting rule cannot be one-
share/one-vote. 
 To see this, we recharacterize the above argument, first in terms of a firm with 
only shares in its capital structure.  There are at least two nonarbitrary ways to assign 
votes.  First, as Easterbrook and Fischel suggest, each share can receive one vote.  But 
then, shareholders can engage in financial engineering to end up with something different 
from a vote, so that economic and voting interests are not aligned.  Second, each net 
share can receive one vote.  In other words, anyone with a net share position receives a 
vote, regardless of their portfolio.  Because financial engineering is zero sum, the number 
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of net shares will equal the number of shares issued and outstanding.  This is true even if 
the holders of the shares do not actually have a vote.   
 For example, suppose there are 100 shares outstanding, and an active market for 
shorting and single-stock futures.  Investors A(1) through A(100) each buy one share and 
short one share.  The investors short shares by borrowing from brokerage firm B, which 
hedges its long position of 100 shares by entering into 100 short single-stock futures 
contracts with investors C(1) through C(100), who each enter into one long single-stock 
futures contract (they are the investors whose financial contracts can be directly traced to 
a shareholder of the corporation).  As previously noted, in the traditional model, A(1) 
through A(100) would have the votes, even though they have no interest in maximizing 
the value of the firm.  But to align voting and economic interests, the legal rule should 
allocate the vote to investors C(1) through C(100). 
 The number of net shares equals the number of shares issued because the 
arbitrage transactions are zero sum.  Neither shorting nor transacting in single-stock 
futures creates a new claim on the cash flows of the firm.  Rather, the firm creates a finite 
set of claims, which then are reallocated through financial engineering.  In other words, 
whoever is left holding a “share- like” claim on the firm is the residual interest holder, not 
the (potentially encumbered) shareholders.  Put another way, the “average” holder of the 
firm’s capital should receive a vote, not the party who happens to have purchased a 
share.104   
 Second, consider the complications associated with the allocation of votes in 
corporations with a more complex capital structure.  Equity-only firms have clear holders 
of the economic residual interest, and those net residual interest holders are “relatively” 
homogeneous, at least in that each of them has an economically equivalent payoff profile.  
Now, consider a firm with equity and debt.  Now one-share/one-vote makes even less 
sense, because some shareholders also are debtholders. 
 Allocating votes to a net residual holder also becomes more difficult.  What if the 
“average” holder of a firm’s capital really has net one share plus net one bond?  Should 
the holder of a net share receive a vote if she also owns a bond?   
 In put-call parity terms, issuing a bond is like buying a put option (which is 
equivalent economically to shorting a share, buying a call and lending).  This should 
subtract votes from the shares issued, in proportion to the value of the short position 
associated with the put option.  In other words, the shareholder, by giving up an option, 
should also have given up a non- linear voting stake, depending on several variables, 
including most importantly the volatility of the underlying cash flows of the 
corporation. 105 
The example becomes even more difficult if, as is typical of most public 
corporations, options are part of the capital structure.  Consider two firms that are 
economically equivalent in every way except capital structure.  Equity Inc. has $1 million 
of warrants and $10 million of equity.  Debt Inc. has $1 million of equity and $10 million 
of debt.  How should voting be allocated?  If the rule allocates votes to equity holders (or 
                                                 
104 Of course, it might be costly to find the true residual interest holders.  A one-
share/one-vote rule would be justified if the cost of allocating votes to true residual holders 
exceeds the benefits.  However, again, the rationale would be based on costs, not incentives. 
105 See Frank Partnoy, Adding Derivatives to the Corporate Law Mix, 34 Georgia L. Rev. 
599, 603-05 (2000). 
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net equity holders), then Equity Inc. and Debt Inc. will make very different decisions 
(Equity Inc. will be more conservative; Debt Inc. will be more aggressive).  In other 
words, the more debt a company has, the more shareholders are advantaged by the vote, 
because they are obtaining more voting control relative to their economic interest.  At the 
extreme, a highly leveraged corporation could be controlled by shareholders who 
committed very little capital. 
To the extent holders of shares, bonds, and options can be thought of as holding 
equivalent economic positions, depending on the corporations’ capital structure, there 
should be a consistent theory of allocating voting rights that matches their economic 
residual position to their votes.  One solution would be to value the “delta” (i.e., the share 
equivalent value of the option) of the optionality in the position (either that associated 
with a warrant, or the economically equivalent option associated with a bond), and add 
that “delta” value to the residual amount.  From a theoretical perspective, there is an 
established net residual interest at the time of issuance.  This method of allocating votes 
depends on several variables, making the number of votes indeterminate and subject to 
change over time.106  Allocating votes under such a system, although theoretically 
defensible, would be prohibitively expensive.107  Again, the rationale for one-share/one-
vote would be one of cost, not incentives. 
Finally, consider what might seem an esoteric point, but is actually quite a 
common problem in practice.  Suppose Firm A has issued shares, and Firm B issues new 
financial instruments whose value is based on the value of Firm A’s shares.  If Firm B 
hedged the new issue, the transactions would zero sum, and it wouldn’t affect the above 
arguments or the available quantum of voting rights.  But what if Firm B didn’t hedge, 
and instead raised capital by effectively issuing new Firm A shares?  Then there would be 
more Firm A shares on a net basis.  The “average” holder of Firm A capital in the market 
would have more shares.  In order to match the voting and economic interest, these new 
net positions arguably should receive a vote, too.108  Ignoring such transactions ultimately 
                                                 
106 From a theoretical perspective, one needs to consider not only how financial 
engineering changes the position of various shareholders, but also the initial position of the 
holders of capital of the firm (i.e., are there just shareholders, or are there bonds, options, and 
other hybrid instruments, too).  In other words, the issue is not only heterogeneity; it also is: what 
is the net position of the holders of a firm’s capital, the position that will remain (net) even after 
all the financial contracting?  That net position is what should be matched with voting rights, but 
it depends on the firm’s capital structure, and therefore the way a firm allocates its votes has to 
depend on its capital structure, too. 
107 But we actually make such calculations in other areas:  insider trading rules as they 
relate to options, disclosure related to options, “net long positions” in the Short Tender Rule and 
in bond sales.  See, e.g., Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal 
Security Holders, SEC Release Nos. 34-28869, 35-25254, IC-17991 (Feb. 8, 1991) (options 
insider trading rules); Disclosure of Equity Compensation Plan Information, SEC Release Nos. 
33-8048, 34-45189 (Dec. 21, 2001) (options disclosure); Commission Guidance on the 
Application of Certain Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, and Rules Thereunder to Trading in Security Futures Products, SEC Release Nos. 33-8107, 
34-46101 (Jun. 21, 2002) (Short Tender Rule). 
108 Note that firms take similar actions within their own capital structure by issuing 
“tracking stock,” whose returns depend only on the cash flows of a subsidiary or business line of 
the corporation; such tracking stock typically does not have a vote.  See Jeffrey J. Haas, 
33
Martin and Partnoy:
Published by Digital USD, 2004
 33
is a decision to allocate votes to stocks, instead of to bonds and options, based on 
transaction costs.   
The above discussion has two purposes.  First, it shows that one-share/one-vote is 
inconsistent with matching voting rights to the economic residual interest in a 
corporation’s cash flows, in numerous complex ways.  Second, it shows that the rationale 
for one-share/one-vote is not based on economic incentives, but rather on transaction 
costs.  Where financial innovation is sufficiently advanced, so that the costs are not too 
great, parties engage in transactions to more closely approximate the theoretical 
possibilities articulated above.  Rules have not developed to prevent them from doing so, 
even though the pressure is away from one-share/one vote.109   
 
   V. THE INEFFICIENCY OF ONE-SHARE/ONE-VOTE 
 
Because the assumptions in the literature on corporate voting do not hold, the 
rules governing corporate voting – specifically one-share/one-vote rules, which assume 
shareholder homogeneity – are inefficient.  In this Part, we assess the suboptimal 
consequences of specific areas of substantive law that depend on these assumptions.  
Inefficiencies arise in part from financial innovation, as sophisticated parties can, and do, 
engage in various types of arbitrage strategies to the detriment of pure residual claimants. 
There are numerous instances of such suboptimal rules.  For example, the quorum 
rules of corporate voting and the percentage-based rules of securities law are inefficient, 
because they erroneously assume shares are not encumbered. 110  More critically, holders 
of encumbered shares engage in arbitrage strategies related to these rules that weaken the 
efficiency rationale for one-share/one-vote.  Below, we focus on two of the most striking 
ways in which these inefficiencies are manifest, which we call “voting arbitrage” and 
“litigation arbitrage.” 
 
A. Voting Arbitrage 
 
Voting arbitrage occurs when parties with encumbered shares are permitted to 
vote notwithstanding the disparity between their economic incentives and those of other 
                                                                                                                                                 
Directorial Fiduciary Duties in a Tracking Stock Equity Structure: The Need for a Duty of 
Fairness, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2089, 2096-97 (1996). 
109 For example, a party could use single -stock futures to purchase a controlling voting 
stake in a corporation with actually paying to purchase stock; legal rules have not evolved to 
prohibit this practice. 
110 Arguably, both quorum rules and percentage-based rules of securities law (e.g., the 
“ten percent” insider holding rule under Section 16(b)) should be adjusted upward to reflect the 
disparity between the number of record shares issued by the corporation and the number of shares 
broker permit to vote (or, alternatively, the rules should be adjusted to deprive encumbered shares 
of votes).  If these rules are not adjusted upward, the existence of encumbered shares will lead to 
more corporations satisfying their quorum requirements than should, and to more shareholders 
falling within percentage categories of securities law than should, both inefficient results 
(assuming the validity of current rules).  Put another way, encumbered shares make it easier for 
corporations to satisfy quorum rules than is intended by state law, and bring more shareholders 
within the coverage of securities regulation than is intended by federal law.  Neither is an 
efficient result. 
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pure residual shareholders.  The assumption that arbitrageurs and other shareholders 
share the same incentives permits arbitrageurs to profit by encouraging or advancing 
suboptimal economic arrangements that destroy the value of shares. 
Voting arbitrage can occur in many ways.  For example, arbitrageurs whose pure 
shareholdings are outweighed by other portfolio positions have incentives to elect 
directors who will not maximize share value (e.g., by increasing volatility, to the benefit 
of option holders but to the detriment of unencumbered shareholders; by taking on 
projects with negative net present value; or by not taking on projects with positive net 
present value).  Similarly, encumbered shareholders have incentives to advance or vote 
for suboptimal shareholder proposals (or to refrain from voting for shareholder proposals 
that would maximize share value).111  Encumbered shareholders also have incentives to 
approve compensation schemes that reduce shareholder value, in particular, to create 
managerial incentives that are more consistent with their own distorted incentives than 
those of pure residual shareholders.112 
Perhaps most importantly, encumbered shares substantially distort the market for 
corporate control.113  Encumbered shareholders will not favor mergers that would benefit 
pure residual shareholders; instead, they might instead favor mergers that would destroy 
share value.  For example, a shareholder who owns ten shares but is short one hundred 
shares (or long one hundred puts) would vote for any merger that would reduce the value 
of her shares, including a below-market tender offer.  Similarly, such a shareholder would 
advocate implementing takeover defenses, even if such defenses would reduce share 
value.  The inefficiency of such a result is obvious. 
The distortion generated by encumbered shares is not merely theoretical; it 
substantially affects prevailing market practices, especially in large public company 
mergers and acquisitions of greatest interest to scholars.  Particularly in share exchange 
mergers, arbitrageurs buy millions of shares of the target corporation and sell short shares 
of the acquirer corporation (a practice known as “risk arbitrage”) to capture price 
disparities between merger-related shares.  As a result, millions of target shares – a 
substantial percentage of the outstanding shares – come to be owned by encumbered 
shareholders with a single incentive: to ensure that the deal is approved, regardless of its 
merits.  If the deal is approved, the risk arbitrageur’s long and short positions offset, 
leaving an arbitrage profit.  The only way such encumbered shareholders lose money is if 
the deal fails.  Accordingly, the one-share/one-vote rule, which gives a vote to 
                                                 
111 In addition, millions of shares are held by program traders who do not have the 
economic incentive to increase share value (because they simultaneously hold shares and 
countervailing negative equity positions) and therefore will have no reason to oppose initiatives 
that benefit managers but not shareholders. 
112 Some scholars have argued that options compensation is necessary to overcome 
managerial risk aversion.  However, if shareholders are encumbered by call options holdings, 
they will have an incentive to award managers call options even if managers are not risk averse 
(or to over-reward options so that managers become risk-preferring).  A similar analysis applies 
to other options positions. 
113 The literature on the market for corporate control, including the abundant scholarship 
related to takeover defenses, has not taken into account this phenomenon. 
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arbitrageurs regardless of their economic incentives, will lead to mergers being approved 
even if they do not benefit pure residual shareholders.114 
In addition to suboptimal merger approval, voting by encumbered shares also 
results in inefficient choice of merger form.  In particular, encumbered shares will favor 
fixed ratio share exchanges rather than cash or variable ratio share exchanges, even if a 
fixed ratio share exchange would generate less share value.  Risk arbitrage is 
substantially easier, and more profitable, in fixed-ratio share exchanges.115  Because 
increased holdings by encumbered arbitrageurs make approval by target shareholders 
more likely, acquirers will have an inefficient voting-related preference for fixed ratio 
exchanges, regardless of whether this form in fact maximizes share value.116 
 
B. Litigation Arbitrage 
 
Recall that Easterbrook and Fischel defend the prevailing one-share/one-vote rule 
as efficient because every shareholder has a claim on the residual assets of the firm.  In 
modern financial markets, however, this is not the case,117 particularly when those 
residual assets actually are distributed, as in shareholder class actions or in corporate 
bankruptcy. 118   Indeed, in these instances, adhering to the fiction that each shareholder is 
entitled to a like residual interest causes substantial inefficiencies, and simultaneously 
overcompensates the encumbered shareholder and undercompensates the pure residual 
shareholder.  The prospect of overcompensation creates incentives for parties to engage 
in inefficient “litigation arbitrage,” transacting to obtain the legal rights associated with 
class action or bankruptcy proceedings.  
For example, in a shareholder class action, distributions (either in a settlement or 
judgment) are made to any shareholder who can demonstrate ownership of the stock 
during the class period.  This includes encumbered shares.  The settlement and judgment 
amount is based upon the number of record shares outstanding during the class period; 
however, due to legal encumbrances (i.e., lending and shorting), the actual number of 
shares is greater than this number.  Moreover, economically encumbered shareholders are 
entitled to recover, even if they were not damaged (or even if, as a result of their net 
                                                 
114 “Reverse arbitrage” – buying acquirer shares, shorting target shares, and voting 
against the merger – potentially could offset such behavior, but the limited liquidity of typically 
smaller targets generally precludes such an approach. 
115 In a cash deal, shorting the acquirer makes no sense; in a variable ratio share 
exchange, the risk arbitrageur does not know how many acquirer shares to short and is therefore 
exposed to additional risk. 
116 Of course, parties might choose a merger form for other reasons (e.g., tax or 
accounting), but to the extent arbitrage occurs, it will result in parties favoring a fixed share 
exchange more than they should. 
117 The claim of homogeneity is easier to make with respect to dividend payments, 
because all shareholders, regardless of whether they are legally encumbered, are entitled to 
payment of dividends, either from the corporation or from a short seller.  However, just as short 
sellers are not obligated to deliver votes to share purchasers, short sellers are not obligated to 
make additional payments as a result of distributions in class action lawsuits or bankruptcy. 
118 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 
Ind. L.J. 625 (1987). 
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negative equity position, they profited).119  Because encumbered shares are entitled to 
recover pro rata, unencumbered shares receive less than the compensation necessary to 
make them whole, and encumbered shares receive a windfall. 
Similarly, shareholders hold residual claims to the assets of a corporation in 
bankruptcy. 120  Although shareholders typically recover only a small interest in 
bankruptcy, that recovery assumes that each shareholder receives a pro rata share, even 
though there are more shareholders seeking such claims in bankruptcy than the number of 
outstanding shares.  As a result, in bankruptcy, the distribution of shareholder rights is 
especially confused.   
Contrast bankruptcy rights with the rights to dividends or a vote.  With respect to 
dividends, the original shareholder retains the right to payment, and the purchaser of the 
loaned shares from a short seller receives payment of dividends from the shorting party.  
With respect to voting, the original shareholder believes she retains the right to a vote, 
but technically the purchaser of the loaned shares from the shorting party acquires the 
voting right.  With respect to bankruptcy, the transfer of rights is indeterminate: both the 
original shareholder and the purchaser of loaned shares believe they are entitled to 
residual rights, but one of them must be wrong.   
With respect to voting, brokers have created elaborate mechanisms to ensure that 
both shareholders can vote.  With respect to bankruptcy, it is not possible to manufacture 
additional residual interests.  Accordingly, overclaims can be avoided only if the number 
of shares loaned and shorted is less than the number of shares that do not appear to claim 
a residual interest.  Moreover, even if overclaiming does not occur, the fact that a single 
share is generating multiple claimants to a single residual share interest results in both 
overcompensation with respect to that particular share and undercompensation with 
respect to the other “pure” shareholders.  The same is true for any corporate dissolution 
or windup. 
In general, it is far too simplistic to assume that shareholders uniformly hold the 
residual claims to a corporation’s assets or cash flows.  Indeed, in litigation where such 
residual claims are actually executed, the one-share/one-vote approach is unfair and 
inefficient.  In both class action lawsuits and bankruptcy litigation, the assumption that all 
common shareholders have “similar if not identical” preferences and homogeneous 
claims leads to perverse results.  Scholars (and lega l rules) should recognize what is 




Because of financial innovation, many shares are encumbered, economically or 
legally.  Shareholders do not uniformly have appropriate incentives to make discretionary 
decisions.  Shareholders do not always have a residual claim to a corporation’s income or 
                                                 
119 For example, a holder of a one share long position and a ten share short position 
would be entitled to recover a share of the proceeds of the settlement or judgment based on the 
one share position, even though her actual economic position was a profit of nine times the losses 
associated with one share. 
120 In addition, to the extent bondholders replace shareholders in the capital structure – 
and obtain votes (or are owed fiduciary duties) – the same analysis of encumbrances applies, this 
time to encumbered bondholders. 
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assets.  Shareholders are not the only parties who receive the margin gains (and incur the 
marginal costs) of corporate decisions; indeed, encumbered shareholders might be 
indifferent or hostile to gains (and instead embrace losses).   
 The corporate law literature has argued that one-share/one-vote is, and should be, 
the dominant rule and practice.  We have shown that this argument is based on 
assumptions that do not hold.  Given the proliferation of financial innovation and 
economic and legal encumbrances, the one-share/one-vote principle no longer constitutes 
an efficient rule of corporate governance, if it ever did. 
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